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The first criticism is that the proposed 
resolution would not require 
manufacturers and, in tum, consumers 
to pay anything approaching the true 
total costs of cigarettes, costs that we 
estimate to be at least $ 7 per pack, a 
number that is considerably higher than 
other estimates that have been reported 
in the media. Our estimate includes 
some, but not all, of the costs borne 
ultimately by smokers themselves, by 
smokers' insurers, and by individuals 
injured by second-hand smoke. It 
includes only future costs and excludes 
many of those. So, for example, the 
figure includes neither the health-care 
costs that have previously been caused 
by smoking nor the future pain-and­
suffering costs borne by smokers or 
family members of deceased smokers. 
Unlike most economists who have 
previously attempted to measure the 
costs of cigarettes, we do not reduce our 
estimate of cigarette costs to take into 
account the "savings" resulting from 
cigarette-induced premature deaths. 
Those savings - measured mostly in the 
form of smokers' unclaimed pension and 
nursing-home entitlements - may not 
in fact be real, and in any event, are not 
relevant to the questions of whether and 
how best to regulate the market for 
cigarettes. 
We should make clear that the 
purpose of the $ 7 per pack figure is not 
to suggest that a tax of $7 per pack 
should be imposed or that, following the 
introduction of the sort of regulatory 
regime we suggest below, cigarette prices 
will rise by $7 per pack. Rather, it is 
meant only to suggest the magnitude of 
the need for some type of regulatory 
intervention. In fact, under the smokers' 
compensation regime that we 
recommend, we would for a number of 
reasons that we cannot pursue here 
expect cigarette prices to rise by no more 
than $3 per pack. 





The proposed resolution is implicitly 
premised on the assumption that some 
form of intervention in the cigarette 
market is necessary In light of evidence 
that smokers typically begin their habits 
at a very early age, tend not to be well 
informed of the long-term health risks of 
smoking, often underestimate 
addictiveness of cigarettes, and often do 
not bear many of the costs associated 
with smoking, we agree that the market 
for cigarettes should not be left 
unregulated. Our second criticism of the 
proposed resolution, however, is that the 
regulatory regime that it would 
implement is almost exactly the inverse 
of what it should be. To understand that 
criticism, it is helpful to step back from 
the proposal itself and ask a more general 
question (a question that, curiously, has 
evaded scholars and commentators to 
this point): What is the best approach to 
regulating cigarettes? 
A. Three categories of regulation 
Regulatory scholars have, in broad 
terms, identified three general categories 
of regulation: command-and-control 
regulation; performance-based regulation; 
and incentive-based regulation. The 
distinctions we draw among the three 
types of regulation are not perfect and 
can, in some instances, begin to blur. 
Thus, some examples of performance­
based regulation begin to look like 
incentive-based regulation. In fact, it is 
probably most accurate to understand 
the three categories of regulation as 
demarcating three points along a 
continuum, with command-and-control 
regulation at one end, incentive-based 
regulation at the other end, and 
performance-based regulation 
somewhere in between. Nevertheless, it 
is useful to maintain the conceptual 
distinctions among the three types of 
regulation to enable us to identify the 
costs and benefits of moving in one 
direction or the other along the 
continuum. 
Under command-and-control 
regulation, sometimes called "input 
regulation, " the regulator imposes 
specific requirements on the firm. The 
regulator in effect tells the regulated firm 
how specifically to run some aspect of its 
business. In regulating pollution, for 
example, the command-and-control 
regulator might prescribe specific steps 
that manufacturers must take, or specific 
technologies that they must use, in order 
to reduce the level of pollution that is 
emitted by their manufacturing 
processes. 
There are many examples of 
command-and-control regulation in the 
proposed resolution. For example, the 
warning requirements and the 
advertising restrictions that would be 
imposed on manufacturers are best 
characterized as command-and-control 
regulations. Similarly, if the Food and 
Drug Administration exercised its limited 
auth01ity under the proposed resolution 
to mandate particular "technically 
feasible, " "less hazardous tobacco 
products, " it would do so in the form of 
command-and-control regulations. 
Under performance-based regulation, 
by contrast, the regulator presents 
manufacturers with a target of some sort, 
which the manufacturers are encouraged 
to meet. That target is sometimes called a 
"performance standard." The 
manufacturers are then left to decide 
how best to achieve that target. One 
performance standard, for example, 
might be a maximum quantity of 
pollution that a firm is allowed to emit 
over a given period of time, such as that 
allowed by tradeable pollution permits. 
Failure to achieve the relevant target, 
however, would result in a fine or 
additional regulation. The proposed 
resolution contains a couple of 
performance-based standards. The best 
known example is the so-called "look­
back" provision, which would set target 
levels of underage smoking that the 
industry would pay a fine for failing 
to meet. 
Performance-based regulation, when 
compared to command-and-control 
regulation, reflects a greater degree of 
humility and skepticism with regard to 
how much the regulator can be expected 
to know about the cutting-edge 
technology in a given industry and a 
greater degree of reliance on the industry 
(or the market) to have and act on that 
information. Nevertheless, both types of 
regulation make substantial informational 
demands on the regulator. 
If there is a performance standard or 
target that is assumed to be desirable, 
performance-based regulation can be 
superior to command-and-control 
regulation as a means of achieving that 
standard, for the reason already 
described - manufacturers have better 
information. In addition, if we know 
what the target standard is, then 
enforcement of such a standard is 
relatively easy (because of the ease of 
monitoring compliance) compared to 
enforcement of command-and-control 
regulation, where the regulator must 
constantly def er to the informational 
advantage of the manufacturer. 
Although there is something to be 
said for performance-based regulation 
over command-and-control regulation, 
it is our view that they both impose 
roughly the same informational demands 
on the regulator. Although we develop 
that argument in considerable detail in 
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ur Arti le, th general idea is captured 
in the foll wing questi n: Ho is the 
perD rmance-ba ed regulat r supposed to 
choose the appropriate target 1 vel of 
perf rmance (or the appropriate fine for 
failing to m et that target)? For ample 
how does Congress or EPA determine the 
aggr gate le el f air or water pollution 
to permit? To answer such questions the 
regulator must ha e information about 
not onl the le el of harm au ed by 
different le els of p llution but also the 
total social costs and benefits of the 
activities that give rise to the pollution. 
Inc ntiv -bas d regulation is superior 
to command-and-control and 
performance-based regulation inasmuch 
as it requires less information of the 
regulator, and it relies more on the 
market to generate the desired regulatory 
outcomes. Under incenti e-based 
regulation, the regulator simply forces 
the manufacturers to pay the total costs 
of their manufacturing a tivities. The 
manufacturers are then left to decide 
what to do about those costs, if anything. 
Thus, incentive-based regulation does 
not tell manufacturers how to run their 
business (as command-and-control 
regulation does). Nor does it require the 
regulator to choose the ideal regulatory 
target (as performance-based regulation 
does). It simply makes the industry pay 
its costs, and lets the market sort things 
out. The general superiority of incentive­
based regulation over command-and­
control regulation in most settings is 
fairly widely accepted among scholars 
and is increasingly recognized by policy 
makers. Indeed, most of the important 
debates in environmental regulation 
seem to be over, not whether to use 
market forces, but how best to use 
market forces as a means of reducing 
pollution. 
It is not our position that command­
and-control and performance-based 
regulation should never be used. There 
are circumstances in which those types of 
regulation may be useful supplements to 
ex post incentive-based regulation. We 
do take the position, however, that those 
types of regulation, especially in the 
cigarette context, are not viable substitutes 
for ex post incentive-based regulation. 
Still, those regulatory alternatives can 
serve a complementary function. Even in 
the cigarette context for example, those 
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forms of regulation might pr h lpful 
as a m ans of redu ing und rage 
smoking. In additi n in some non­
cigarette situations (for e 'ampl , in 
dealing with the pr blems of air 
p llution created b aut mobile 
emissions), either command-and- ntr l 
performance-based, or perhaps an e cis 
tax ("e ante incenti e-based r gulati n' 
may be the only a ailable opti ns. This 
would be true if e post incenti e-based 
regulation (of the type we describe in 
greater detail in the text below) wer 
considered impractical perhaps be ause 
the harms associated with generalized air 
pollution are too widely dispersed to gi e 
rise to e post damage claims brought by 
individual victims. It should be 
emphasized, however, that the cigarette 
market presents a setting in which e 
post incentive-based regulation is 
available as a regulatory option. 
B. The problem with the 
proposed resolution 
Given this consensus in favor of 
incentive-based regulation, one would 
hope that any proposal to regulate 
cigarettes would rely most heavily on 
incentive-based approaches, with little 
emphasis on command-and-control and 
performance-based regulation. In fact, 
however, the proposed resolution takes 
just the opposite approach. It is 
dominated by a renewed and 
strengthened emphasis on command­
and-control regulation, including 
everything from new warning 
requirements to new FDA control over 
the level of nicotine and other 
ingredients in tobacco products. And the 
proposed resolution is especially 
remarkable for its lack of incentive-based 
regulatory approaches. In fact, by sharply 
curtailing products liability law as a 
means of regulating manufacturer 
behavior, the proposed resolution would 
eliminate the only existing incentive­
based system with any potential for 
internalizing the external costs of 
smoking. 
In addition, the settlement contains 
the occasional performance-based 
approach - such as the "look back" 
provision designed to achieve specific 
targets of underage smoking by various 
points in time - but those provisions, 
by virtually all accounts, involve 
penalties for failure to achieve the 
relevant targets that are too weak. 
Moreover, as we will show in the text 
below, even if the penalties are increased, 
the way in which the penalties would be 
apportioned among tobacco companies 
(essentially on a market-share basis) 
would undermine each company'.s 
incentives to reduce underage smoking. 
To get a clearer picture of the limits of 
the command-and-control and 
performance-based regulations outlined 
in the proposed resolution, consider the 
following questions: 
• What if the proposed cigarette 
warnings and advertising restrictions are 
ineffecti e, as they have been in the past? 
• What if, in response to 
requirements that they must turn over to 
the FDA all research regarding potential 
alternati e, potentially safer, cigarette 
designs cigarette manufacturers stop 
conducting such research? 
• What if the FDA does identify a 
cigarette design that appears likely to be 
safer than on entional designs? Should 
the FDA mandate it. What if smokers 
increase their o erall consumption of 
cigarettes be ause of the ne design? 
What if the safer cigarette is unpopular 
be ause of, say, unpleasant taste 
attributes? Should the FDA require that 
all cigarettes adopt the new design? If 
not, will the FDA require that cigarette 
manufacturers market cigarettes with the 
safer design as aggressi ely as they 
market their con entional brands? 
•What about the look-back 
provision? Why is the target reduction 
le el s t at 60%? What if the look-back 
provision is successful in encouraging the 
industry to reduce underage smoking to 
target levels but many individuals who 
do not begin as underage smokers 
simply picl up the habit at age 18? 
C. The benefits of incentive-
based regulation 
Incentive-based regulation would 
significantly reduce the problems 
suggested by the preceding set of 
questions. It would do so by taking 
government regulators out of the role of 
trying to make complex economic and 
scientific determinations and by relying 
instead on the expertise of manufacturers 
and on the power of market forces. 
The proposed resolution arguably 
includes an incentive-based component, 
insofar as the costs imposed on 
manufacturers are required to be passed 
through to consumers in the form of a 
price hike. That mandated price hike 
would, like an excise tax, force 
manufacturers to bear at least some of 
the costs of their products. Viewing the 
proposed regulation in that light, some 
scholars have complained that the price 
hike is too small. According to Jeffrey 
Harris, for instance, the proposed 
agreement would, if adopted, have the 
effect of a $0.62 per pack excise tax on 
cigarettes. In addition, some senators and 
the Clinton administration ha e recently 
suggested the possibility of increasing the 
price hike to some amount closer to 
$ 1.50 per pack. (See Jeffrey Taylor, 
'More Senators Seem to Back Increasing 
Cigarette Prices Beyond Level in Accord,' 
Wall Street]oumal, A4, Sept. 17, 1997.) 
There appears to be an emerging 
consensus among commentators and 
policy makers, in other words, that the 
regulatory effect of the de facto excise tax 
needs to be enhanced and will ha e a 
greater regulatory effect than that of 
other aspects of the proposed resolution. 
With that conclusion we agree. An 
e cise tax probably does ha e certain 
advantages over command-and-control 
or performance-based regulation. 
Howe er, as an incentive-based system of 
regulation an excise tax has distinct 
disad antages when compared with what 
we refer to as "e post incenti -based 
regulation." By an po t inc ntiv -bas d 
syst m we m an a regi.m in which a h 
cigarette manuf actu� r is fore d to pa the 
t mal co ts caused by its brand of 
ciga� tt s as those costs actuall b com 
PR! 1 
manifest - that is, manufacturers pay 
damages ex post. 
An excise tax, which can be thought 
of as an "ex ante incentive-based" regime, 
has two important disadvantages when 
compared with an ex post incentive­
based regime. First, choosing the 
appropriate rate of tax requires the 
regulator (as in the case of command­
and-control and performance-based 
regulation) to have an enormous amount 
of information up front (at the time the 
tax rate is set) about the costs and 
benefits of cigarettes, including the costs 
and benefits of alternative cigarette 
designs. In contrast, under an ex post 
regime, costs would be imposed on 
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cigarette manufacturers only as the 
external harms caused by cigarettes 
actually became manifest. Thus, although 
the regulator would be responsible for 
sorting out after the fact what harms had 
been caused by cigarettes and should be 
charged to manufacturers, it would be 
the cigarette manufacturers who would 
decide up front how to make and market 
cigarettes to minimize those costs. 
The second disadvantage of an excise 
tax, compared with an ex post approach, 
is that an excise tax does not create 
incentives for cigarette manufacturers to 
compete over safety This is a very basic 
point, but it is extremely important and 
is central to our argument for an ex post 
regime (and to our critique of the 
proposed resolution). At best, an e cise 
tax (and the de facto excise tax 
contemplated in the proposed resolution) 
would impose on each manufacturer the 
average per pack external costs for the 
whole industry Such a tax, however, 
provides no incentive for manufacturers 
to make investments in developing and 
manufacturing safer cigarette designs 
(such as nicotine-free cigarettes or low­
carcinogen cigarettes) or in identifying 
relatively low-risk smokers (people who 
are least likely to suffer harmful effects 
from smoking) . Any such innovations 
would cost a manufacturer money - the 
research and development costs among 
others - but would provide essentially 
zero benefit to that manufacturer given 
that the taxes are f1.Xed (or, if variable, are 
assessed on a market share basis). 
lf the taxes are fixed, then, of course, 
nothing that a manufacturer does can 
lower them. Even if the taxes vary to 
reflect the changes in the average costs of 
cigarettes, however, manufacturers vvill 
not invest to lower those costs because 
the benefit of su h investment� would be 
shared with the whole industry in the 
form of a reduced industry-wide excise 
tax. Again, each manufacturer would 
have a strong incentive to make no such 
safety-enhancing investments. This 
phenomenon is a special case of what 
policy scholars call the "common pool" 
or "free rider" problem. We sometimes 
refer to it as the "unraveling problem," 
because, under such a scenario, the 
market for safety improvements may 
unravel, as each manufacturer realizes 
that making investments in safety 
enhancements is not in its financial best 
interest. 
D. The smokers' compensation 
alternative 
An ex post incentive-based regime 
can, at least in theory, overcome the 
unraveling problem associated with an 
excise tax and can thereby create the 
market incentives for manufacturers to 
compete over safety. Such an ex post 
regime can force each manufacturer to 
bear the hamis caused by its brand of 
cigarettes specifically and not just the 
average harm caused by the industry as a 
whole. To achieve that goal, one of the 
essential elements of any ex post 
incentive-based regime would be an 
ability, even if imperfect, to trace harms 
to specific brands. 
The specific form of ex post incentive­
based regulation that we will emphasize 
here is a regime that we call "smokers' 
compensation." One of many possible 
versions of such a system would rely on 
a newly created administrative board 
with authority to adjudicate the 
compensation claims. Someone suffering 
from a smoking-related illness would 
bring a claim to that board and present 
evidence regarding his or her injury and 
smoking history. If necessary causal links 
were established, the board would award 
compensation to the claimant and then 
charge the manufacturer or 
manufacturers for the amount paid out. 
But, whatever form it might take, a 
smokers' compensation system is 
distinguishable from an excise tax in the 
follovving ways: 
• Fact finding with regard to harms 
caused by cigarettes would be based on 
evidence of actual harms after they have 
occurred rather than on speculation 
regarding possible future harms. 
• Manufacturers, rather than 
regulators, would conduct the ex ante 
cost-benefit analysis regarding what 
safety investments to make, what 
product design changes to consider, and 
how those changes will affect product 
demand. 
• Costs would be imposed on 
manufacturers on a brand-specific, rather 
than on a fixed, industry wide, or market 
share basis. 
• Incentives to compete over 
increased safety would be created, rather 
than dulled or eliminated. 
•Victims of smoking-caused harm 
themselves would voluntarily come 
forward with information regarding 
harms caused by cigarettes, thereby 
providing useful information regarding 
brand-specific risks. 
The smokers' compensation system 
can also be distinguished from products 
liability law - another ex post incentive­
based regime. Under the current rules, 
products liability law is the only existing 
ex post incentive-based regulation of 
cigarettes. Some commentators complain, 
however, that that regime has been 
wholly ineffective, a complaint we 
challenge below. Other commentators 
and industry officials may worry that 
products liability law, in its current form, 
presents the tobacco industry with an 
unacceptable level of uncertainty as to 
what the industrys overall liability for 
smoking-caused harm will be. It is also 
sometimes argued that the tort system 
entails relatively high administrative costs 
compared to other systems of deterrence. 
In response to such conceITlS, consider 
the following ways in which the 
proposed smokers' compensation model 
might be cheaper, simpler, and more 
certain than its tort law alternative: 
• The fact finding determination 
would be conducted by an administrative 
board or an administrative law judge 
rather than by a lay jury. 
• This fact finder could be specially 
trained in dealing with scientific 
evidence, or could be authorized to 
solicit advice from experts or a blue­
ribbon panel of scientists. 
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• The damages for ea h typ of 
sm king-caused harm could be pre­
determined based on some typ f grid 
s stem, whereby a gi en harm pr du es 
a gi en (i.e. , certain) 1 1 of damag 
payment from the manufa turer. 
• The only fact finding question 
ould be causation. Hence there would 
be no need for expensi e fact finding on 
such questions as product defect, 
industry standards assumption of risk, 
and the like. 
• Although the need for litigation in 
hard cases would not be eliminated, the 
claims adjustment process could become 
more routinized than is the case with 
current product liability claims, thereby 
reducing administrati e costs. 
If the above-listed aspects of the 
proposal do not provide enough 
certainty, it might be possible to impose 
an overall cap or budget on the amount 
of damages that can be paid by the 
cigarette industry in a gi en year, so long 
as the damage payments within that cap are 
allocated among manufacturers according to 
each company's relative causal share of the 
harm, and not just according to market share. 
This has been a necessarily sketchy 
outline of a smokers' compensation 
approach to regulating cigarettes. We 
have made no effort here to work out all 
the details of such a program, nor do we 
expect that that task will prove easy 
Still, there are a variety of ways in which 
such a regulatory regime might be 
adjusted or tailored without eliminating 
its beneficial effects. We would note, 
moreover, that there are existing 
regulatory regimes to which policy 
makers may usefully look for guidance 
regarding how to implement a smokers' 
compensation regime. The most obvious 
analogy, given the name we have chosen, 
is workers' compensation. Another 
analogy would be no-fault automobile 
insurance. The smokers' compensation 
regime that we have in mind, after all, is 
essentially a no-fault system with the 
cigarette companies acting as the insurers 
of smoking-caused harms. 




There are two possible objections to an 
ex post incentive-based system, such as a 
smokers' compensation system, as 
compared to an ex ante incentive-based 
system of regulation, such as an excise tax. 
A. Strategic avoidance 
of regulatory incentives 
First, an excise tax might be presumed 
superior because it would be charged as 
the cigarette is sold rather than when the 
injury occurs. Because, under a smokers' 
compensation system, manufacturers 
would be liable for the harms of 
cigarettes sold many years earlier, a 
smokers' compensation system would 
arguably create opportunities for cigarette 
manufacturers to evade the regulator'.s 
incentive-creating sanctions. For 
example, after profiting for twenty years 
or so, a new entrant to the cigarette 
market might simply distribute its assets 
to its shareholders, rendering itself 
largely immune to the threat of smokers' 
compensation claims. To be sure, the 
manufacturer would then be bankrupted 
by the smokers' compensation claims, 
but only after many years of profiting 
substantially and distributing those 
profits to shareholders. Legal scholars 
sometimes describe this as a "judgment­
proofing" or "hit and run" strategy. 
There are several reasons why such 
judgment-proofing strategies are unlikely 
to be adopted by manufacturers. For 
example, sophisticated long-term 
creditors would - and, in other 
industries, do - include covenants 
prohibiting (or, more generally, increasing 
the costliness oD such strategies. Also, 
opportunities for strategic avoidance of 
regulatory incentives exist for virtually all 
forms of regulation. For instance, 
manufacturers could avoid the effect of 
an excise tax by directly or indirectly 
selling their brands on black markets, as 
may be common in other countries that 
have substantial cigarette tariffs. That 
evasion strategy would be less effective 
under a smokers' compensation system 
because manufacturers would have to 
pay for the harms caused by all of their 
cigarettes, even those purchased on black 
markets. Indeed, for that reason, 
manufacturers would have a strong 
incentive to discourage the emergence of 
black markets in their own cigarettes. 
Finally, there are regulatory policies that 
could be adopted that would prevent 
manufacturers from evading the threat of 
future liability For instance, as is 
provided for under the proposed 
resolution, manufacturers might be 
required to put up a substantial bond, to 
ensure that some assets are available in 
the future. Similarly, as is the case for 
virtually all European corporations, 
manufacturers might be required to meet 
minimum capitalization requirements, 
which would serve the same purpose as 
a bond. Finally, as is true of automobile 
drivers in most of the states in this 
country, cigarette manufacturers could be 
required to purchase a minimum amount 
of liability insurance which would cover 
the costs of future potential liability 
B. The personal responsibility 
question 
Others might object to a smokers' 
compensation system (or to any other 
type of victim-initiated ex post incentive­
based system) on the ground that it 
compensates smokers for the harms 
caused by cigarettes and thus removes 
from them any responsibility for their 
own decisions. The goal of a smokers' 
compensation system is to enhance 
public health. But if the goal were to 
force individuals to own up to, or take 
responsibility for, their actions, we are 
aware of no policy response that would 
be superior to a smokers' compensation 
system. That'.s true for several reasons. 
For starters, smokers would have to 
pay when purchasing each pack of 
cigarettes, in the form of higher product 
prices, for their right to make a claim 
later, when a smoking-caused illness 
occurs. The arrangement is no different 
from that between insureds and their 
first-party insurers. Thus, smokers would 
not be getting something for nothing and 
would not be evading responsibility 
Indeed, the whole goal of this type of 
incentive-based system is not to let 
smokers off the hook but to force 
smokers to take responsibility by forcing 
each smoker to place his money where 
his mouth is. Absent such a price 
increase, smokers would continue to 
disregard the substantial costs that their 
smoking poses to themselves and to 
others; and smokers would continue to 
have to "take responsibility" for risks that 
they were not fully aware of. Moreover, 
the harms caused by cigarettes are, of 
course, often quite serious. And even to 
the extent smokers or their families 
receive compensation for some of the 
costs of cigarette-caused harms, it is 
difficult to say that the dead or seriously 
ill smoker ever fully evades the ultimate 
responsibility for her smoking decisions. 
Finally, of course, smokers are not the 
only actors who should be accountable 
for their actions. Under an ex post 
incentive-based regime, tobacco 
manufacturers, too, would be forced to 
bear responsibility for their actions. 
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Those who are interested in the 
cigarette problem might ask questions 
such as: "Doesn't the proposed resolution 
represent a step in the right direction?"; 
and "In light of the fact that the apparent 
momentum in Washington to enact a 
comprehensive federal regulatory 
response to the cigarette problem might 
die, shouldn't we embrace the proposed 
resolution or something substantially 
similar to it while we have the chance, 
rather than be returned to the status 
quo?" 
In our view, the answer to both 
questions is "no." Taking public health as 
the overriding goal, we would, if forced 
to choose, pick the status quo. To 
understand why, it is necessary first to 
understand that critics and supporters of 
the proposed settlement share two flawed 
premises, which nevertheless seem to be 
dictating the terms of the policy debate. 
First, both sides assume that the primary 
purpose of products liability law in this 
context is, not to serve public health 
goals, but simply to compensate those 
injured by smoking. Second, both sides 
seem to agree that civil liability laws 
have, to date, failed to serve that or any 
other worthwhile goal. Consequently, 
most participants in the debate have 
indicated in one way or another that the 
elimination of tort law would be no big 
loss, even for smoking plaintiffs. The 
proponents of the proposed resolution, 
for instance, point out that, even if 
$368.5 billion does not cover all the 
harms, past and future, caused by 
cigarettes, it is a lot more than nothing, 
which is what manufacturers have paid 
in tort damages to date. Critics of the 
proposed resolution are typically less 
explicit. They make their views known 
either by not mentioning the effect of the 
proposed resolution on tort law or by 
indicating that they would not challenge 
that effect if only the proposed resolution 
could be adjusted to better serve public 
health goals. 
Arguably, however, the principal goal 
of products liability law is, broadly 
speaking, public health, not compensation. 
In the cigarette context in particular, the 
question then becomes whether the 
public-health goal is better achieved 
through products liability law or through 
the types of regulation envisaged in the 
proposed resolution. Those who would 
sacrifice products liability law to accept 
the proposed resolution implicitly 
assume that the public health benefits of 
the latter would outpace the public 
health benefits of the former. But, 
perhaps because of the general anti-tort 
sentiment in this country, that 
presumption has been largely 
unexamined and is, for several reasons, 
highly questionable. 
First, products liability law comes far 
closer, at least in theory, to providing an 
ex post incentive-based type of 
regulation than any alternative form of 
regulation now being considered (other 
than the smokers' compensation regime 
we are proposing) . Moreover, products 
liability law could have more than just a 
theoretical impact. It is true that no 
substantial product liability judgments 
have been won against the tobacco 
industry Nevertheless, products liability 
law is currently in a state of flux or 
disequilibrium; and the growing 
likelihood of many large civil judgments 
against the industry is a big part of what 
pushed the industry to the negotiating 
table and thus what made the $368.5 
billion settlement offer possible. In other 
words, to say that the settlement 
agreement would produce $368.5 billion 
while product liability law has produced 
nothing is to misunderstand what 
motivated the agreement in the first 
place. 
It would be more accurate to claim 
that administrative regulation, not tort 
law, has failed those who have been 
harmed by cigarette smoking. The FDA 
has long declined to exercise its authority 
in this area, presumably because of the 
political power of the cigarette industry 
and because of the FDA's lack of 
expertise regarding how best to regulate. 
Furthermore, it has been administrative 
regulation that has effectively derailed 
otherwise viable products liability claims 
against cigarette manufacturers. For 
example, the FTC-promulgated warning 
labels have given rise to the preemption 
defense and greatly strengthened the 
assumption-of-risk defense in tort law. 
Those defenses have until very recently 
proved an insurmountable barrier to tort 
recovery Thus, in light of this past 
experience with administrative 
regulation, it is not clear that we should 
have much confidence in the expanded 
role for administrative regulation 
contemplated in the proposed resolution. 





That brings us to our final 
observation. The history of tobacco 
regulation makes clear one ery 
disturbing fact. The cigarette industry 
has, using a ariety of strategies, 
successfully managed to protect itself 
throughout this century against any form 
of meaningful regulation. By far, its most 
successful strategy has been to meet the 
threat of tough regulations with 
preempti e, command-and-control-style, 
anemic regulations. The experience with 
FTC warning requirements is a case in 
point. But there are many others. Within 
the last several years, that practice has 
been especially evident at the local level, 
where the industry has supported some 
state tobacco control legislation in an 
effort to preempt the authority of city, 
town, and county governments to 
control the sale and use of tobacco. With 
that historical backdrop in place, it is 
illuminating to look briefly again at the 
promises and the likely effects of the 
proposed resolution. As will become 
clear, the proposed resolution appears to 
be just one more example - this time 
on a grander scale - of a very successful 
long-term tobacco-industry strategy 
The proposed resolution states that 
"[a] key element in achieving the Acts 
goals will be forcing a fundamental 
change in the way the tobacco industry 
does business. " With that assessment we 
completely agree. The proposed 
resolution also claims that it would 
"provide for means to ensure that the 
industry will not only comply with the 
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letter of the la but will also ha e 
p erful incenti es t pre ent underage 
usage of tobacco produ ts and to strive 
to d elop and market less hazardous 
tobac o products." As our an lysis has 
indi ated, however, that 1 im is 
unfounded. 
Indeed, as already emphasiz d, th 
mix of regulatory regimes h s n by the 
proposed resolution - mostly 
ommand-and-control; some qualified 
performance-based; and virtually zero e 
post incentive-based regulation - is 
precisely the reverse f what most policy­
oriented scholarship would recommend. 
Moreover, it is from the tobacco 
industry's perspective, ideal. In light of 
the industry's track record, therefore, the 
choice of that mix of regulatory regimes 
was probably no accident. 
As noted above, command-and­
control is the least effective form of 
regulation in this type of setting. It 
requires the regulator to have an 
enormous amount of information about 
the product, information that the 
regulator often must rely on the industry 
to provide. Insofar as the industry is the 
source of the regulators information, it 
becomes relatively easy for the industry 
to manipulate the process and avoid 
really having to bear the costs of its 
actions. Furthermore, the regulations 
themselves are severely limited by the 
inability of the regulator to anticipate 
every counter-move that the industry 
might make in its attempt to thwart the 
regulator - or, more accurately, to save 
the money that would otherwise have to 
be spent in complying with the spirit of 
the regulation. As we have argued, those 
criticisms certainly apply to the 
settlements numerous command-and­
control regulations. To be sure, the 
agreement also contains some elements 
of performance-based regulations, which, 
in theory, might pose somewhat of a 
regulatory threat to the cigarette industry 
As other critics have noted and our 
research shows, however, the 
performance-based aspects of the 
settlement are rendered quite anemic by 
the substantial ex ante and ex post 
loopholes and the relatively minor 
surcharges for failing to meet 
performance targets. 
Considering the big picture, therefore, 
we have no trouble rejecting the 
suggestion that the proposed settlement 
w uld s meh w substantially alter the 
cultur or in ntiv s of th t ba o 
industry 1i the contrary, th basic 
in nti s f manufactur rs w uld 
r m in. Th y w uld still s k t  find nd 
1 phol s in th regulati ns. 
uld still se k to misrepr s nt the 
nsum rs and r gulators. 
ur ery strong s ns at the nd of 
th day is that th proposed resolution 
uld a c mplish precis ly what 
pr vi us fforts t regulate the cigarett 
industry have a complished. Specifically, 
the prop sal would er ate the illusion of 
regulation (at least initially) while 
simultaneously protecting the industry 
and smokers from having to bear the 
costs of cigar ttes. 
Based on our analysis, we would 
recommend that Congress reject the 
proposed resolution and start over from 
scratch, this time beginning with the 
following question in mind: How can we 
design an effective ex post incentive­
based response to the cigarette problem? 
In our forthcoming Yale Law journal 
article (cited above), we discuss the 
framework for beginning that analysis, 
although much work on the details 
remains to be done 
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